20 original questions · FLK1 and FLK2

Free SQE1 practice questions with fully worked answers

Attempt each single best answer before opening the worked solution. Choose one option without checking the answer, then compare your reasoning with every explanation before moving on.

Law stated as at 11 September 2026 · Updated 30 September 2026

Before you begin

These are original Solon Prep practice questions. They are not official sample questions, recalled questions, past papers or predictions of what will appear in an assessment.

For the regulator’s own materials, consult the official SRA sample questions and the SQE1 assessment specification.

FLK1

Business Law and Practice

Question 1 of 20

Which of the following statements about the director's liability for the debt is correct?

A company is a private company limited by shares. A director owns 80% of the issued shares and is the sole director; a shareholder owns the remaining 20%. The company has fallen into serious financial difficulty and owes a substantial sum to a trade supplier, which has obtained judgment against the company for the debt. The company has very few assets and cannot pay. The director has paid in full for all the shares he holds. The trade supplier now wishes to recover the outstanding amount from the director personally.

AThe director is personally liable for the full debt, being the majority shareholder and sole director.
BThe director is liable only up to 80% of the company's outstanding debts, reflecting his shareholding.
CThe director has no further liability for the company's debts, as his shares are fully paid up.
DThe director and the shareholder are jointly liable, in proportion to their respective shareholdings.
EThe director is personally liable because the company has insufficient assets to satisfy the debt.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — The director has no further liability for the company's debts, as his shares are fully paid up.

Why this option wins

A company is a separate legal person, distinct from its shareholders and directors. The debt to the trade supplier is owed by the company, not by the people who own or run it. In a company limited by shares, a shareholder's liability is limited to any amount still unpaid on their shares. The director has paid in full for all his shares, so there is nothing more he must contribute. He cannot be pursued for the company's debt just because he is a shareholder. Holding 80% of the shares and being the sole director does not change this, because a director is not automatically liable for the company's debts. The trade supplier's judgment is against the company, so it must look to the company's assets for payment.

Why the other options fail

A: Control is the tempting feature here, but owning most of the shares and being the only director does not make the director liable for what the company owes. The company is a separate legal person, and the debt remains its own.
B: No rule links a shareholder's liability to their percentage of the shares. A shareholder's only exposure is any amount unpaid on their shares, and the director's is nil because he has paid in full.
D: Shareholders are being treated here as if they were partners sharing the firm's debts. Members of a limited company are not jointly liable for its debts at all. The company itself is the debtor.
E: A company's lack of assets does not pass its debt to a shareholder. It simply means the creditor may go unpaid, with no claim against a shareholder whose shares are fully paid. This reaches personal liability for the wrong reason.

Question 2 of 20

What is the woman's chargeable gain on this disposal, before applying the annual exempt amount?

A UK-resident woman bought a commercial unit several years ago as an investment, paying £200,000 for it plus £4,000 in legal and surveyor fees on purchase. Last month she sold the unit to an unconnected buyer for £350,000, incurring £6,000 in estate agent and legal fees on the sale. The unit was never her home and qualifies for no special reliefs.

A£150,000, being sale proceeds less the original purchase price, ignoring other costs
BNil, because gains on the disposal of investment property fall outside the charge to capital gains tax
C£146,000, being sale proceeds less purchase price and acquisition costs, ignoring the costs of sale
D£144,000, being sale proceeds less purchase price and disposal costs, ignoring acquisition costs
E£140,000, being sale proceeds less the purchase price, acquisition costs and disposal costs

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — £140,000, being sale proceeds less the purchase price, acquisition costs and disposal costs

Why this option wins

A chargeable gain is the disposal proceeds less the allowable costs. The allowable costs include the price paid for the asset and the incidental costs of buying it. They also include the incidental costs of selling it, such as legal fees, surveyor's fees and estate agent's fees. The woman sold the unit for £350,000. From this she deducts the £200,000 purchase price, the £4,000 legal and surveyor fees on purchase and the £6,000 estate agent and legal fees on sale. Those costs total £210,000. £350,000 − £210,000 = £140,000. Her chargeable gain before the annual exempt amount is therefore £140,000. Only this figure takes account of every allowable deduction.

Why the other options fail

A: Deducting the purchase price alone ignores the £4,000 acquisition costs and the £6,000 costs of sale. Both are allowable deductions, so £150,000 overstates the gain by £10,000.
B: A commercial unit held as an investment is a chargeable asset. A UK-resident individual who sells it is within the charge to capital gains tax. Nothing in the facts gives an exemption or relief that would reduce the gain to nil.
C: The purchase price and the £4,000 acquisition costs are rightly deducted, which makes this tempting. However, the £6,000 costs of sale are equally allowable, and leaving them out overstates the gain at £146,000.
D: Deducting the £6,000 costs of sale is correct, but the £4,000 legal and surveyor fees paid on purchase are also allowable. Omitting them leaves the gain £4,000 too high at £144,000.

Question 3 of 20

What are the company's total taxable profits chargeable to corporation tax for the period?

A trading company prepared accounts for its 12-month accounting period ending 31 March 2026. Its trading profit, after all allowable trading expenses and capital allowances, was £820,000. During the period it sold an office building, realising a chargeable gain of £150,000 after indexation. It also paid £40,000 of interest on a non-trading loan, which is treated as a non-trading loan relationship debit, and it made a £30,000 charitable donation under the gift aid arrangements for companies.

A£820,000
B£900,000
C£940,000
D£970,000
E£1,000,000

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: B — £900,000

Why this option wins

A company's taxable total profits are worked out in three steps. First, bring together its income profits and its chargeable gains. Then take off the reliefs that reduce total profits. Start with the trading profit of £820,000 and add the chargeable gain of £150,000. That gives £970,000. Next, deduct the £40,000 non-trading loan relationship debit and the £30,000 qualifying charitable donation, because both reduce total profits: £970,000 − £40,000 − £30,000 = £900,000 So the company's taxable total profits are £900,000. This is the figure on which corporation tax is then charged at the applicable rate.

Why the other options fail

A: Only the trading profit is counted here. The chargeable gain is left out, but a company's gains are part of its taxable total profits, not taxed separately. Both deductions are also ignored.
C: This figure adds the gain and deducts the charitable donation, but it forgets the £40,000 non-trading loan debit, which also reduces profits. It tempts because it handles the gift aid donation correctly.
D: Adding trading profit and the gain (£820,000 plus £150,000) is the right first step. But stopping there ignores the loan debit and the charitable donation, both of which reduce taxable profits.
E: Here the £30,000 donation has been added to the profits instead of deducted (£820,000 plus £150,000 plus £30,000), and the loan debit is ignored. A qualifying charitable donation reduces total profits. It never increases them.

Dispute Resolution

Question 4 of 20

Which of the following statements about the report is correct?

A private limited company is being sued by a distributor for supplying contaminated stock, and litigation was clearly in prospect from the moment the distributor's solicitors sent a letter of claim. Two weeks after that letter, the company's operations director commissioned a report from an external food-safety consultant. The instruction letter records that the report was wanted 'partly to assess our exposure in the expected court claim and partly to improve our production processes going forward', and the evidence is that the two purposes were of equal importance. The report is damaging. The distributor seeks its disclosure, and the company claims privilege.

AThe report is privileged, since any document created after a dispute arose is protected regardless of purpose.
BThe report cannot be privileged, since an external consultant prepared it and only lawyers' work attracts privilege.
CThe report is privileged only if litigation was its dominant purpose; equal purposes will not suffice here.
DLegal advice privilege covers all confidential documents produced within a business, including external consultants' reports.
EThe report must be disclosed, but the company may first redact the passages damaging its case.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — The report is privileged only if litigation was its dominant purpose; equal purposes will not suffice here.

Why this option wins

Litigation privilege can protect confidential communications between a client, or its lawyer, and a third party such as a consultant. Two key conditions apply. First, adversarial litigation, such as a court claim, must be reasonably in contemplation. Second, the dominant purpose of the communication must be use in, or advice about, that litigation. Where a document was made for more than one purpose, the court asks which purpose was dominant. If two purposes carry equal weight, neither is dominant and the test fails. Here, litigation was clearly in prospect once the letter of claim arrived. However, the instruction letter records two purposes of equal importance: assessing the claim and improving production. The dominant purpose requirement is therefore unlikely to be met, so privilege is unlikely. The report will have to be disclosed, because a document that damages the company's case falls within its disclosure obligations.

Why the other options fail

A: Timing alone gives no protection. A document created after a dispute arises is privileged only if all the conditions of litigation privilege are met, including the dominant purpose requirement, and that is the weak point here.
B: This is tempting because the author is not a lawyer, but litigation privilege is exactly the head of privilege that can cover communications with third parties such as consultants and experts. The problem with this report is why it was made, not who made it.
D: Legal advice privilege covers only communications between lawyer and client made for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. It does not extend to confidential business documents generally, and it cannot cover a report written by an external consultant.
E: No party may remove passages simply because they hurt its case. Redaction is proper only for irrelevant or privileged material, and the damaging content is precisely what the disclosure obligation requires the company to reveal.

Question 5 of 20

What additional amount will the court order the company to pay?

A woman sued a private limited company for £95,000. The claim was allocated to the multi-track and is not subject to fixed recoverable costs. Four months before trial she made a Part 36 offer to accept £70,000, which the company did not accept. At trial the woman was awarded £82,000, a judgment at least as advantageous as her own offer. The court finds it is not unjust to apply the usual consequences, which include enhanced interest, indemnity costs from the end of the relevant period, and an additional amount calculated as a percentage of the sum awarded.

A£4,100
B£7,000
C£8,200
D£16,400
E£75,000

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — £8,200

Why this option wins

Where fixed recoverable costs do not apply, a claimant who obtains a judgment at least as advantageous as her own Part 36 offer normally receives an additional amount, together with enhanced interest and indemnity costs from expiry of the relevant period, unless that would be unjust. That amount is 10% of the sum awarded, up to £500,000. Any part of the award above £500,000 attracts 5%. The total additional amount can never exceed £75,000. The percentage is applied to the sum the court awards, not to the figure in the offer. The woman was awarded £82,000, which is well within the first £500,000, so the whole award attracts 10%. 10% × £82,000 = £8,200 This is far below the £75,000 cap, so the cap plays no part. The company must pay an additional £8,200.

Why the other options fail

A: Halving the rate to 5% is wrong here. That lower rate applies only to the part of an award above £500,000, and all of the woman's £82,000 falls within the band where 10% applies.
B: £7,000 is 10% of the £70,000 offer, not of the judgment. It tempts because the offer is what triggers the consequences, but the percentage is always calculated on the sum the court actually awards.
D: £16,400 doubles the correct figure by applying 20%. There is no 20% rate in the additional-amount calculation, which uses only 10% and, for very large awards, 5% on the excess.
E: £75,000 is the maximum additional amount the court can order, not a standard award. The cap only matters where the percentage calculation would exceed it, which is nowhere near the case on an £82,000 judgment.

Contract Law

Question 6 of 20

What is the most likely outcome of the buyer's claim?

At a provincial auction house, a private collector sold a landscape painting to a buyer by private treaty. The auction house's sale particulars described it only as 'Landscape, oil on canvas'. Both parties genuinely believed, on the strength of an old gallery label on the back, that it was by a minor Victorian artist whose work commands respectable prices, and the agreed price reflected that belief. Neither said anything to the other about the attribution. Each simply relied on the label. An expert later established that the painting is a competent later imitation worth a fraction of the price paid. The buyer now seeks to escape the contract and recover his money.

AThe contract is void for common mistake, as the shared belief made the painting worth far less.
BThe buyer can reject the painting, as it does not correspond with its description under the implied term.
CThe contract is void, as a shared mistake about the painter is a mistake as to subject matter.
DThe contract can be set aside in equity, as the shared mistake was fundamental and unfair to enforce.
EThe contract stands, as a shared mistake about attribution goes to quality, not identity.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The contract stands, as a shared mistake about attribution goes to quality, not identity.

Why this option wins

A shared mistake makes a contract void only in rare cases. The mistake must make the subject matter essentially different from what the parties thought they were dealing in, as where the goods no longer exist. A mistake about the authorship of a painting goes to its quality and value, not its identity. The collector and the buyer bargained for this particular canvas, and that is what the buyer received. The buyer has no other route out. The sale particulars said nothing about the artist, and the collector made no statement about it. So the attribution was not part of any description by which the painting was sold, and there was no misrepresentation. Each party simply relied on the label. The risk of a wrong attribution stays where it fell. The contract stands, however much money turns on the mistake.

Why the other options fail

A: This is the natural reaction to a large gap between price and value, but a drop in value is not enough. The mistake must make the thing sold essentially different. A wrong attribution affects worth, not the essence of the painting.
B: The implied term as to description applies only where the goods are sold by reference to a description the buyer relies on as part of the bargain. Here the particulars said only 'Landscape, oil on canvas', and the collector said nothing about the artist.
C: Relabelling the artist as the painting's 'identity' does not change the analysis. The physical object bargained for was delivered, and a mistake about authorship is treated as a mistake about quality, not about what the subject matter is.
D: This reflects an older view that equity could relieve against shared mistakes the common law would not. That separate and more generous equitable jurisdiction has since been rejected, so unfairness alone will not allow the contract to be set aside.

Question 7 of 20

Can the contractor recover the additional £15,000?

A private limited company engaged a building contractor to refurbish its offices for a fixed price of £80,000, with completion due by 30 June. Midway through the works, the contractor realised he had underpriced the job and told the company's facilities manager that he could not finish on time at the agreed price. Concerned that delay would force it to postpone a planned relocation and incur penalties under its existing lease arrangements, the company promised to pay the contractor an extra £15,000 if he completed on time. The contractor finished the works by 30 June. The company now refuses to pay the additional £15,000, arguing that the contractor was already bound to do the work.

AThe company is not bound to pay, as the contractor provided no fresh consideration.
BThe company is bound to pay, since promises made during an existing contract are enforceable.
CThe company is bound to pay, having obtained a practical benefit without duress.
DThe company is not bound to pay, as variations must be made by deed.
EThe company is bound to pay only if the contract permitted varying the price.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — The company is bound to pay, having obtained a practical benefit without duress.

Why this option wins

A promise to pay more for work someone is already bound to do can still be binding. It is supported by consideration if the promisor gets a practical benefit from the performance and the promise was not obtained by economic duress or fraud. Here the company gained a real practical benefit from the contractor finishing on time. It avoided having to postpone its relocation and risk penalties under its lease arrangements. The contractor was already bound to do the work, but that practical advantage is enough consideration. Nothing suggests the contractor improperly pressured the company. The company itself offered the extra sum to protect its own commercial position. The promise to pay the additional £15,000 is therefore binding, and the contractor can recover it.

Why the other options fail

A: The old strict rule said that doing what you are already bound to do is no consideration. It tempts for that reason, but it ignores the practical benefit principle. The company obtained exactly that kind of benefit from timely completion.
B: Promises made during performance are not automatically enforceable. There must still be consideration, usually a practical benefit, and the promise must not have been obtained by duress. The blanket claim of automatic enforceability is wrong.
D: No general rule requires contractual variations to be made by deed. A deed is simply one way to make a promise binding without consideration. An informal variation can be enforceable if it is supported by consideration, as it is on these facts.
E: There is no general requirement for the original contract to contain a clause allowing the price to change. The company's later promise is binding because the practical benefit it received from timely completion provides the consideration needed to support it.

Legal System

Question 8 of 20

May the court depart from its earlier decision?

The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) is hearing an appeal in a contractual dispute between a person and a private limited company. Counsel for the company argues that the court should refuse to follow one of its own earlier Court of Appeal decisions, which directly governs the issue. Counsel submits that the earlier decision is plainly out of step with modern commercial expectations and that the court should adopt a fresh approach. There is no later inconsistent decision of the Supreme Court, the earlier decision was not given without reference to a relevant authority, and the earlier decision is not in conflict with any other Court of Appeal decision.

AThe court may depart from its earlier decision because it appears right given changed commercial expectations.
BThe court may decline to follow its earlier decision if it certifies the case suitable for a leapfrog appeal.
CThe court may decline to follow its earlier decision, as it is not strictly bound by its own previous decisions.
DThe court is bound to follow its earlier decision, because a single judge cannot overrule three judges.
EThe court is bound to follow its earlier decision, as none of the established exceptions applies here.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The court is bound to follow its earlier decision, as none of the established exceptions applies here.

Why this option wins

The Court of Appeal in civil cases must normally follow its own earlier decisions. It may refuse to do so only in narrow recognised situations. The three main ones are where two of its own earlier decisions conflict, where its earlier decision cannot stand with a later Supreme Court decision, and where the earlier decision was reached in ignorance of a relevant statute or binding authority which shows that it was wrong. The facts rule out all three. Nothing suggests any other exception either, such as a later conflicting ruling of the European Court of Human Rights. Counsel's argument is simply that the earlier decision is commercially out of date. That is not a recognised ground for departing from it. The court is therefore bound to follow its earlier decision.

Why the other options fail

A: Only the Supreme Court may depart from its own previous decisions when it appears right to do so. The Court of Appeal has no such general power, so changed commercial expectations cannot justify departure here.
B: Leapfrog certification is a matter for the trial court. It allows an appeal to go directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal, if the Supreme Court also gives permission. It has nothing to do with whether the Court of Appeal may ignore its own binding precedent.
C: The claim that the Court of Appeal is never strictly bound in civil matters reverses the true position. The general rule is that it is bound, subject only to narrow exceptions, and none applies on these facts.
D: The appeal is heard by a panel of Court of Appeal judges, not a single judge. The binding effect comes from the doctrine of precedent, not from how many judges sat. The conclusion is right but the reason given is invented.

Tort

Question 9 of 20

For which losses is the man liable, and why?

In March 2026, a man was carelessly reversing his van in a supermarket car park when he struck a woman at low speed. She suffered bruising to her leg. The woman had a history of depression but had been well, and off all treatment, for three years. The man knew nothing of this. Medical evidence shows that the collision triggered a severe depressive illness. Without the collision, she would have stayed well. She was unable to work for six months and lost her earnings. The man admits that he drove negligently. He argues that he should pay only for the bruising, because a person of ordinary mental robustness would not have become ill after such a minor incident.

AOnly the bruising, because a person of reasonable fortitude would not have developed a psychiatric illness.
BThe bruising and the depression, but not the lost earnings, which are pure economic loss.
CAll three losses, because each flowed as a direct consequence of his careless reversing of the van.
DOnly the bruising, because psychiatric illness is a different kind of harm from the foreseeable physical injury.
EAll three losses, because some personal injury was foreseeable and he must take her as he finds her.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — All three losses, because some personal injury was foreseeable and he must take her as he finds her.

Why this option wins

Damage is too remote only if it is not of a kind that was reasonably foreseeable. The woman was directly involved in the collision and was physically injured, so she is a primary victim. For a primary victim, physical injury and psychiatric injury count as the same kind of harm: personal injury. Once some personal injury was foreseeable, it does not matter that psychiatric illness itself was not foreseeable. Nor does it matter that a person of ordinary fortitude would not have become ill. The man must also take the woman as he finds her, including her vulnerability to depression, so he is liable for the full extent of her illness. Her lost earnings flow from that personal injury. They are consequential economic loss, which is recoverable. The man is therefore liable for the bruising, the depression and the lost earnings.

Why the other options fail

A: The reasonable fortitude requirement applies to secondary victims, who perceive an accident involving another person or its immediate aftermath. It does not apply to someone like the woman, who was struck and physically injured herself. It is tempting because it matches the man's argument closely.
B: This mistakes consequential loss for pure economic loss. The woman's lost earnings arise directly from her personal injury, so they are recoverable in the ordinary way.
C: This reaches the right result for the wrong reason. The old test of 'direct consequence' has been replaced by the test of whether the kind of damage was reasonably foreseeable. Liability here rests on foreseeable personal injury and the eggshell skull rule.
D: For a claimant directly involved in the accident, physical and psychiatric injury are treated as one kind of harm. Because physical injury was foreseeable, the depression is not too remote. This option applies the foreseeability test too narrowly.

Legal Services

Question 10 of 20

Does the associate solicitor commit an offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 if she makes no disclosure?

An associate solicitor is in the commercial property department of a limited liability partnership. She is not the LLP's money laundering reporting officer. In May 2026 a business owner, who owns a successful car valeting business, instructs her on the proposed purchase of a warehouse. At their first meeting he explains that about £200,000 of the price will come from cash takings. He says he has deliberately kept these takings off his business accounts for several years to avoid paying income tax. He asks the associate solicitor to advise on structuring the purchase through a newly formed company so that HMRC cannot trace where the money came from. The associate solicitor tells the business owner that the proposal is unlawful and that she will not act for him. She has not reported the matter to anyone.

ANo offence, because having refused the instructions she was not concerned in any arrangement.
BNo offence, because the business owner gave her the information in privileged circumstances when seeking advice.
CAn offence of failing to disclose, as privilege does not cover information given to further crime.
DNo offence, because undeclared income is not criminal property until HMRC has assessed the tax due.
EAn offence of tipping off, because telling the business owner she would not act alerted him to her suspicion.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — An offence of failing to disclose, as privilege does not cover information given to further crime.

Why this option wins

The associate solicitor works in the regulated sector because she is a solicitor acting on a property transaction. She therefore commits an offence if she knows or suspects money laundering from information received in the course of that business and does not make a disclosure. The business owner has told her plainly that he evaded income tax and wants to hide the proceeds. That gives her grounds to suspect money laundering. The tax he saved is criminal property. A legal adviser normally has a defence where the information came to her in privileged circumstances. That defence does not apply where the information was passed on with the intention of furthering a criminal purpose. The business owner asked for advice precisely so that he could conceal the source of the funds from HMRC. The privilege defence is therefore lost. Refusing the instructions does not remove her duty to report. She should disclose to the LLP's money laundering reporting officer. If she does not, she commits the failure to disclose offence.

Why the other options fail

A: This is correct as far as the arrangement offence goes. The associate solicitor declined to act, so she has not facilitated anything. However, refusing the work does not end her separate obligation to report what she knows. It is the failure to disclose offence that she risks here.
B: This is the general privilege defence, and it is the tempting answer. Here it is displaced. The business owner gave her the information in order to get help concealing criminal proceeds from HMRC. Information given to further a criminal purpose is not treated as received in privileged circumstances.
D: Deliberately evading income tax is a criminal offence. The pecuniary advantage gained, meaning the tax saved, is criminal property as soon as it is obtained. There is no need for HMRC to have made an assessment first.
E: Tipping off under POCA concerns disclosures about a report or money-laundering investigation that are likely to prejudice an investigation. Neither a report nor an investigation features here. Simply telling a client that you will not act on an unlawful proposal is not tipping off.

FLK2

Property Practice

Question 11 of 20

What should the buyer's solicitor require in order to complete the purchase safely?

A buyer is buying a registered freehold house from a woman for £420,000. The buyer's solicitor is examining the official copy entries. The proprietorship register names the woman and a man as registered proprietors from June 2019. It also contains this entry: 'RESTRICTION: No disposition by a sole proprietor of the registered estate (except a trust corporation) under which capital money arises is to be registered unless authorised by an order of the court.' The man died in March 2026. The woman's solicitor has written to say that the woman will sign the transfer as surviving proprietor. The letter says she will provide a certified copy of the man's death certificate on completion.

AA transfer executed by the woman alone, supported by a certified copy of the man's death certificate.
BA transfer executed by the woman and a second trustee she appoints, with the price paid to them both.
CA transfer executed by the woman and the man's personal representatives once a grant has been obtained.
DA transfer by the woman alone with her statutory declaration of beneficial entitlement by survivorship.
ECancellation of the restriction on production of the man's death certificate, then a transfer by the woman.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: B — A transfer executed by the woman and a second trustee she appoints, with the price paid to them both.

Why this option wins

The restriction in the proprietorship register is a Form A restriction; it does not prove beneficial ownership. When the man died, the legal title passed to the woman by survivorship. Any separate beneficial share would form part of his estate. A buyer who pays the money to a sole trustee does not overreach such an interest, so it could bind the buyer. The Land Registry will also refuse to register a transfer by the woman alone while the restriction remains. On these facts, the buyer's solicitor should insist that the woman appoint a second trustee. That trustee can be the man's personal representative. The woman and the second trustee should then sign the transfer, and the price should be paid to both of them. This overreaches any separate beneficial interests and satisfies the restriction.

Why the other options fail

A: A death certificate alone cannot remove this restriction. A sole proprietor's transfer would not overreach a separate beneficial interest and could not be registered while the restriction stands.
C: Personal representatives hold no legal title here, because the man's legal title passed to the woman by survivorship. His representatives could be appointed as the second trustee, but they do not need to join in their capacity as representatives. Nor is there any need to wait for a grant.
D: A sworn declaration can look like proof that the woman now owns everything, which is why it tempts. But a declaration alone does not remove this registered-title restriction. Paying the price to the woman as sole trustee would also fail to overreach any separate beneficial share forming part of the man's estate.
E: A restriction of this type does not fall away because one proprietor dies. Cancellation needs further evidence; a death certificate is insufficient.

Question 12 of 20

What should the solicitor do?

A solicitor is acting for both a man, who is buying a flat with a mortgage, and a private limited company, the lender, on the same transaction. Before exchange, the solicitor learns that the man intends to let the property out to tenants immediately after completion, even though the mortgage offer is for an owner-occupier loan and expressly requires the property to be occupied by the borrower. The man tells the solicitor he does not want the lender to know this and asks her to say nothing. The solicitor's retainer with the lender requires her to report anything that might affect its decision to lend.

AThe solicitor should keep the man's intention confidential, as her duty of confidentiality to him overrides any disclosure duty to the lender.
BThe solicitor should disclose the intention to the lender, since disclosure duties to one client always override confidentiality owed to the other.
CThe solicitor should cease acting for both: she cannot disclose to the lender without the man's consent, nor continue acting whilst withholding it.
DThe solicitor should continue acting for both clients, simply noting the issue on file in case the lender raises it later.
EThe solicitor should disclose the intention to the lender, since as the more commercially important client its interests take priority.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: C — The solicitor should cease acting for both: she cannot disclose to the lender without the man's consent, nor continue acting whilst withholding it.

Why this option wins

The solicitor owes the lender a duty to tell it anything material to its decision to lend. The man plans to let the flat once the purchase completes. That would breach the owner-occupier condition in the mortgage offer, so it is plainly material. She also owes the man a duty to keep his affairs confidential, and he has refused to let her tell the lender. These two duties now conflict. She cannot tell the lender without breaching the man's confidence. Nor can she carry on acting for the lender while knowingly keeping from it information it needs. She cannot do both properly and the man will not consent, so she cannot continue to act in the matter. The right course is to stop acting for both clients. That way she neither discloses the man's confidential information nor misleads the lender by staying silent while still acting for it.

Why the other options fail

A: Confidentiality does not simply win here. The solicitor may not disclose without the man's consent, but that does not allow her to keep acting for the lender while hiding a material fact. The conflict means she must withdraw, not stay silent and carry on.
B: No rule says a disclosure duty to one client automatically overrides confidentiality owed to another. The solicitor cannot breach the man's confidence without his consent. The proper response to the clash is to cease acting, not to disclose against his wishes.
D: A file note does nothing to resolve the conflict that exists now. Carrying on for the lender while knowingly withholding material information would breach her duty to the lender and her duty to act with integrity.
E: How commercially important a client is has no bearing on which duty prevails. The solicitor still cannot disclose confidential information without consent. The clash between her duties requires her to withdraw, whatever the lender's value to the firm.

Wills and the Administration of Estates

Question 13 of 20

Is the widower's will valid?

A widower, aged 81, instructed a solicitor in February 2026 to prepare a new will leaving his whole estate to his son and nothing to his daughter. He gave detailed and rational instructions. A doctor assessed him at that meeting and confirmed that he then had testamentary capacity. In April 2026, before the will was ready, the widower suffered a stroke. The solicitor prepared the will exactly in line with his instructions and took it to him in hospital in May 2026. By then the widower could not recall what assets he owned, or that his daughter might have a claim on him. When the solicitor asked whether this was the will he had asked her to prepare, leaving everything to his son, he clearly said yes. He signed it in the presence of two witnesses, who both then signed. The widower died in July 2026. The daughter challenges the will on the ground of lack of capacity.

AValid, as he gave instructions with capacity and knew he was signing the will so prepared.
BInvalid, as he could not recall his property or its extent when he executed the will.
CValid, as the presumption of capacity for a duly executed will places the burden on the daughter.
DInvalid, as under the Mental Capacity Act test he could not retain the information needed.
EInvalid, as the golden rule required a doctor to witness the will and confirm his capacity.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: A — Valid, as he gave instructions with capacity and knew he was signing the will so prepared.

Why this option wins

Normally a testator must have testamentary capacity when he signs the will. That means understanding what a will does, the extent of his property and the claims of those he ought to consider. There is an important exception. The capacity requirement can still be met if three things are true. The testator had full capacity when he gave instructions. The will was prepared in line with those instructions. When he signed it, he understood that he was signing the will he had instructed. The widower's instructions were given with capacity, which a doctor confirmed at the time. The solicitor drafted the will exactly as instructed. At signing, the widower clearly confirmed it was the will he had asked for, leaving everything to his son. It does not matter that he could no longer recall his assets or his daughter's claim. The will was properly signed and witnessed, so it is valid.

Why the other options fail

B: This states the general rule that capacity is tested at execution, and on its own it would defeat the will. It overlooks the exception for a will prepared on instructions given with capacity, where the testator understands at signing that it is that will.
C: The conclusion is right but the reasoning is not. The widower's inability to recall his assets or his daughter raises a real doubt about capacity at execution. Those propounding the will must establish that the exception applies.
D: Testamentary capacity is judged by the common law test, not the Mental Capacity Act test, for wills made by the testator himself. Even on the proper test, the instructions exception means the widower's inability to recall details at signing does not invalidate the will.
E: Having a doctor present is good practice to avoid disputes, but it is not a legal requirement for validity. Two ordinary witnesses meet the formal requirements, and the widower's capacity was in fact medically confirmed when he gave his instructions.

Question 14 of 20

Which of the following statements about the personal representative's liability for the debt is correct?

A man died last year, and his sister is the sole personal representative administering his estate. The estate includes a portfolio of shares and a buy-to-let flat. The personal representative distributed the residue to the beneficiaries seven months after the grant, without placing any advertisement for creditors. Three months later, a builder presented an unpaid invoice of £14,000 for repair work carried out on the flat shortly before the man died. The personal representative had no knowledge of this debt when she distributed the estate, and the beneficiaries have already spent the money they received.

AThe personal representative is personally liable because she distributed the estate before the end of the first year of administration.
BThe personal representative can avoid personal liability only if the builder's claim is statute-barred or otherwise unenforceable.
CThe personal representative has no personal liability, as she did not know of the debt at the date of distribution.
DThe personal representative has no personal liability; the beneficiaries received the money, so the builder must pursue them.
EThe personal representative is personally liable because she failed to advertise for creditors before distributing the estate.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The personal representative is personally liable because she failed to advertise for creditors before distributing the estate.

Why this option wins

A personal representative can protect herself against claims from creditors she does not know about. To do so, she places the statutory advertisements inviting claims and waits for the notice period, which must be at least two months, before she distributes. If she follows that process, she is not personally liable for debts she had no notice of. The creditor can still pursue the beneficiaries who received the assets. The personal representative never advertised, so she has none of that protection. Her honest lack of knowledge of the builder's invoice does not help her. By distributing without taking the proper protective steps, she remains personally liable to the builder for the unpaid £14,000.

Why the other options fail

A: The first year of administration is a red herring. A personal representative cannot generally be forced to distribute within that year, but distributing early does not by itself make her liable for unknown debts. What the personal representative lacked was the protective advertisement, not a longer wait.
B: This sounds plausible, because an unenforceable claim would defeat liability, but it misplaces the issue. The debt here is recent and enforceable. The personal representative's exposure arises from her failure to advertise for creditors, which is the step that would have protected her.
C: Ignorance of a debt is not, on its own, a defence. The statutory protection against unknown claims depends on the personal representative having advertised and waited for the notice period. The personal representative did neither, so her lack of knowledge does not help her.
D: A creditor may indeed pursue beneficiaries who received estate assets, and in practice recovery from them may be difficult once they have spent the money. That right does not release a personal representative who distributed without advertising, so the personal representative remains personally liable.

Solicitors Accounts

Question 15 of 20

What must the firm now do about the report and its accounting records?

A compliance officer works at a small firm whose accounting period ended on 30 April 2026. The firm holds client money for several conveyancing clients, including a private limited company. The firm's accountant completed the examination and signed an accountant's report on 15 September 2026. The report identifies several breaches of the SRA Accounts Rules and concludes that they show a failure to keep client money safe.

AThe firm must obtain the report by 31 October 2026 and deliver it to the SRA only if a client suffers a loss.
BThe firm need not deliver the report to the SRA because the accountant has already recorded the breaches, but must keep records for six years.
CThe firm must obtain and deliver the report within three months of the period end and keep accounting records for at least three years.
DThe firm must deliver the report to the SRA within six months of signing it and keep accounting records for at least six years from the period end.
EThe firm must obtain the report by 31 October 2026, deliver it to the SRA by then as it is qualified, and keep records for at least six years.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The firm must obtain the report by 31 October 2026, deliver it to the SRA by then as it is qualified, and keep records for at least six years.

Why this option wins

A firm must obtain an accountant's report within six months of the end of its accounting period. Here the period ended on 30 April 2026, so the report had to be obtained by 31 October 2026. Most reports need not be sent to the SRA. A qualified report is different. A report is qualified where the accountant concludes that client money has not been kept safe, as this one does. A qualified report must be delivered to the SRA within the same six months, so also by 31 October 2026. Separately, the firm must keep its accounting records for at least six years. Only this answer correctly combines the deadline to obtain the report, the duty to deliver a qualified report and the six-year retention period.

Why the other options fail

A: The obtaining deadline is right, but delivery does not wait for a client to suffer loss. A report showing that client money has not been kept safe is qualified and must be sent to the SRA whether or not anyone has actually lost money.
B: Simply recording breaches does not create the duty to deliver. The duty arises because the accountant has concluded that client money was not kept safe, which makes the report qualified, and a qualified report must go to the SRA. The six-year retention point is correct.
C: No three-month deadline and no three-year retention rule exist. The report must be obtained, and a qualified report delivered, within six months of the period end, and records must be kept for at least six years.
D: The six-month delivery deadline runs from the end of the accounting period, not from the date the accountant signs. Reading it from signature would push the deadline to March 2027, well beyond the 31 October 2026 limit.

Question 16 of 20

Is the man entitled to receive interest on the money he provided?

A man instructs a firm of solicitors to act on his purchase of a flat. He sends the firm £180,000, which is held in the firm's general client account for eleven weeks while the transaction proceeds to completion. During that period the firm earns a small amount of bank interest on the pooled funds in the general client account. The firm has a written policy on accounting to clients for interest, which sets out the circumstances in which a sum will be paid.

AThe firm must pay the man the exact bank interest actually earned on his £180,000 while held.
BThe man is entitled to interest only if he expressly requested payment of interest at the outset.
CThe firm need never pay interest on money in a general client account, only in a designated account.
DThe firm may keep all interest earned as it provides banking facilities at its own cost.
EThe firm must account to the man for a fair and reasonable sum of interest, applying its policy.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The firm must account to the man for a fair and reasonable sum of interest, applying its policy.

Why this option wins

When a firm holds client money, it must account to the client for interest on a fair and reasonable basis. It does not have to pass on the exact interest the bank credited on the pooled general client account. Instead, it pays the client a fair and reasonable sum. The firm is expected to have a written policy on interest, and here that policy sets out the circumstances in which a sum will be paid. The man's £180,000 sat in the general client account for eleven weeks while his purchase went through. The firm must therefore account to him for a fair and reasonable sum of interest, applying its policy. The correct answer is E.

Why the other options fail

A: Interest is owed, which makes this tempting. However, the duty is to account on a fair and reasonable basis. It is not a duty to pay the precise bank interest earned on the man's money within the pooled general account, so insisting on the exact figure misstates the standard.
B: The man did not need to ask for interest at the outset. The duty to account for a fair and reasonable sum arises simply because the firm holds his money, not because the client made an earlier demand.
C: Money in a pooled general client account still attracts the duty to account for fair and reasonable interest. The type of account does not remove the obligation, so it is wrong to confine interest to separate designated accounts.
D: A firm cannot keep all the interest as a matter of course. It has a real obligation to account to the client for a fair and reasonable sum, applying its interest policy.

Land Law

Question 17 of 20

Who is entitled to the items?

A woman recently bought a converted barn from a man. After completion she and the man disagree about three items left at the property. The first is a large free-standing oak dining table resting on the floor by its own weight. The second is a bank of fitted kitchen units screwed into the walls and plumbed in, which can only be removed by tearing out sections of the wall plaster. The third is an antique mirror simply hung on a nail. The man claims he is entitled to take all three items because they were his personal possessions. The woman disputes this. The sale contract says nothing about any of the items.

AThe fitted kitchen units pass to the woman as land, while the table and mirror remain the man's chattels.
BAll three items pass to the woman, because everything inside a building at completion becomes realty.
CNone of the items pass to the woman, since items brought in by a previous owner remain personal property.
DThe table and the fitted kitchen units pass to the woman, while the mirror remains the man's chattel.
EOnly the table passes to the woman, since objects resting by their own weight on a floor are fixtures.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: A — The fitted kitchen units pass to the woman as land, while the table and mirror remain the man's chattels.

Why this option wins

Whether an item has become part of the land depends on two things. The first is how firmly it is attached. The second, and more important, is the objective purpose of putting it there. The contract is silent, so these general rules decide the dispute. The kitchen units are screwed to the walls and plumbed in. They cannot be removed without damaging the plaster. Both the degree of attachment and the obvious purpose of permanently improving the property make them fixtures, so they pass with the land. The table rests only by its own weight and is not attached at all, so it stays a chattel. The mirror hangs on a single nail. That is only slight attachment, and the purpose is to display the mirror rather than to improve the building. It too remains a chattel. Only the kitchen units pass to the woman.

Why the other options fail

B: No rule says that everything inside a building at completion becomes part of the land. Attachment and purpose must be assessed item by item. On that basis the unattached table and the lightly hung mirror remain chattels.
C: This invents a rule. Items can become part of the land when they are attached for the purpose of improving it, whoever brought them in. The fitted kitchen units are exactly such items, so they pass to the woman.
D: The table is wrongly treated as a fixture here. A free-standing table resting only by its own weight is not attached, and its purpose is use as furniture. It therefore remains the man's chattel.
E: Resting by its own weight points towards an item being a chattel, not a fixture, and there is no absolute rule to the contrary. This answer also wrongly excludes the firmly attached kitchen units, which are fixtures.

Trusts

Question 18 of 20

Is the trust valid as a charitable trust?

Under her will, a woman left £400,000 to her trustees "to apply the income for the promotion of mountaineering among the youth of the local town, and otherwise for such sporting purposes as my trustees in their absolute discretion think fit." The trustees seek advice on whether the gift takes effect as a valid charitable trust. The will identifies no human beneficiaries and contains no mechanism for distributing capital to individuals. Mountaineering instruction would be open to all young people in the town without charge.

AValid and charitable: advancement of amateur sport is a recognised charitable purpose, applied exclusively to that purpose.
BVoid because sport can never qualify as charitable under any recognised description of charitable purpose.
CValid as a non-charitable purpose trust, being sufficiently certain for the court to order performance.
DValid and charitable: it confers public benefit on the town's youth, an appreciably large class of persons.
EFails as charitable because the "sporting purposes" limb allows funds for purposes not exclusively charitable.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — Fails as charitable because the "sporting purposes" limb allows funds for purposes not exclusively charitable.

Why this option wins

A trust can only be charitable if it is for charitable purposes and nothing else. Advancing amateur sport is a recognised charitable purpose. Free mountaineering instruction open to all the young people of the town could qualify on its own. The gift does not stop there. It lets the trustees apply the income, in their absolute discretion, for any 'sporting purposes' they think fit. That wording is not limited to amateur sport, and it does not require any benefit to the public. The trustees could lawfully spend the money on professional sport, or on sport for a small private group. Neither would be charitable. Because the money could go to non-charitable ends, the trust is not exclusively charitable. It fails as a charitable trust, even though the mountaineering purpose would qualify on its own.

Why the other options fail

A: Amateur sport can indeed be charitable, which is why this tempts. But the gift is not exclusively for that purpose. The open-ended 'otherwise for such sporting purposes' limb lets the trustees spend on sport that is neither amateur nor for public benefit.
B: No such blanket rule exists. The advancement of amateur sport is a recognised charitable purpose, and the mountaineering limb could qualify on its own. The gift fails because it is not exclusively charitable, not because sport is excluded from charity.
C: A non-charitable purpose trust is generally void under the beneficiary principle. There is no human beneficiary who can enforce it, and sport is not one of the recognised anomalous exceptions. Certainty of purpose does not cure that defect.
D: Public benefit is required for charitable status, and the mountaineering limb may well meet it. That is not enough, however. Even if public benefit is shown, the trust fails because the wider sporting limb allows non-charitable spending.

Criminal Law and Practice

Question 19 of 20

Is the woman guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent?

During a heated argument outside a pub, a woman shoved a man hard in the chest. The man stumbled backwards, lost his footing on the kerb and fell, striking the back of his head on the pavement. He suffered a fractured skull and significant bleeding to the brain, requiring emergency surgery. The woman later told police she only meant to push him away to end the confrontation and had no idea he would fall, though she accepted she pushed him deliberately and that some minor hurt was a risk. The prosecution is considering charging the woman with causing grievous bodily harm with intent.

AThe woman is guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because she deliberately used unlawful force causing serious harm.
BThe woman is not guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because a single push cannot cause such harm.
CThe woman is not guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because the fall, not the push, immediately caused his injury.
DThe woman is guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because she foresaw some harm might result from her deliberate push.
EThe woman is not guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because she did not intend to cause really serious harm.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: E — The woman is not guilty of causing grievous bodily harm with intent because she did not intend to cause really serious harm.

Why this option wins

This offence needs a specific intention. The defendant must intend to cause really serious harm, or intend to resist or prevent a lawful arrest. Intention means it was her aim or purpose. If serious harm was virtually certain and she realised that, the jury may find intention from that foresight. The woman pushed the man deliberately. But she says she only wanted to end the confrontation, and at most she foresaw some minor hurt. Nothing suggests she aimed to cause serious harm or saw it as virtually certain. Without that high level of intention, this offence cannot be proved, even though serious harm did in fact result. A lesser offence based on foresight of some harm might fit, but this one does not.

Why the other options fail

A: A deliberate act and a serious result are not enough on their own. Using force deliberately is a mental element of sorts, but it is not the one this charge requires, which is an intention to cause really serious harm. The answer tempts because it pairs two true facts.
B: No rule says a single push cannot cause grievous bodily harm, and a fractured skull with bleeding to the brain plainly qualifies. The charge fails on the mental element, not because of how the injury was caused.
C: Causation is intact. The push started a natural and foreseeable chain of events that ended in the fall and the injury, so the woman remains the legal cause. She escapes this charge because intent is missing, not because the chain was broken.
D: Foreseeing that some harm might result is the kind of mental state that fits lesser assault offences. It falls well short of intending really serious harm, which is what this charge demands.

Question 20 of 20

Which of the following best describes the man's liability for an attempted arson offence?

In April 2026, a man fell out with his neighbour over a boundary fence. Late one night, the man filled a bottle with petrol, lit a rag in its neck and went to the neighbour's house. The neighbour's car was parked on the driveway against the front wall of the house, beside a concrete path. The man planned to throw the bomb onto the concrete path so that it burst into flames next to the car and frightened the neighbour. He realised the flames might catch the car and spread to the house, where the neighbour's family were asleep. He did not want anyone hurt and did not care whether the car was damaged. The bomb landed on the path and burnt out, damaging nothing. The man has been arrested.

AAttempted aggravated arson: he was reckless as to both damaging property and endangering life.
BAttempted simple arson only: recklessness as to damage suffices, but danger to life must be intended.
CNo attempted arson: landing on concrete made damaging property impossible.
DNo attempted arson: he only foresaw a risk of damage, without intending to damage property.
EAttempted aggravated arson: throwing the lit petrol bomb was an act more than merely preparatory.

Reveal fully worked answer

Correct answer: D — No attempted arson: he only foresaw a risk of damage, without intending to damage property.

Why this option wins

An attempt needs two things: an act that is more than merely preparatory, and an intention to commit the full offence. Where no property is damaged, the defendant must intend to damage property. For attempted aggravated arson, recklessness as to whether that damage would endanger life can suffice. Here, nothing was damaged, so the damage is the missing element. The man had to intend to damage property. He did not. He aimed at the concrete path to frighten the neighbour and merely foresaw a risk that the car might catch fire. Recklessness as to that damage cannot support an attempt, whether of simple or aggravated arson. His recklessness about endangering life does not help, because it attaches to damage he never intended. Throwing the bomb was plainly more than preparation, but without the required intention there is no attempted arson.

Why the other options fail

A: This is the trap. It is true that recklessness as to danger to life can support attempted aggravated arson. That only works, though, where the defendant intends the damage, which is the missing element. The man was merely reckless about damaging the car, and that is not enough for an attempt.
B: This reverses the correct position. For an attempt, the missing damage must be intended, while danger to life may be foreseen recklessly. The man's recklessness as to damage to the car cannot found attempted simple arson either.
C: Factual impossibility is no defence to an attempt, and in any case damage was not impossible here, because the flames could have caught the car. The real reason there is no attempt is that the man did not intend to damage anything.
E: The act element is satisfied, since throwing a lit bomb goes well beyond preparation. An attempt also requires intention to bring about the missing element, however, and the man did not intend to damage property. The act alone does not make him liable.